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H.R. 7040: CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE
NONDISCLOSURE
Favorable laws and public policy have produced a tremendous
growth in the number and size of corporations in the last century.'
Government regulation was originally limited to corporate behavior as
it affected shareholders.' In the past decade, however, as corporate be-
havior has had a more direct effect on the public, the federal govern-
ment refocused its attention by expanding corporate regulation through
numerous agencies and statutes?
Despite available civil penalties, the government has relied increas-
ingly on adjunct criminal sanctions4 to enforce compliance with corpo-
rate regulations.5 Furthermore, independent criminal legislation
recently has emerged in an effort to regulate corporate behavior.6 One
proposed statute, H.R. 7040,7 would amend Title 18 of the Federal
1. Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reforn" Berle and Means Reconsid-
ered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 414 (1977).
2. Id.
3. Thirty regulatory statutes and seven new agencies were created between 1970 and 1975.
Lilley & Miller, The New "SocialRegulation, " 47 PUB. INTEREST 49, 49-50 (1977). See also Devel-
opments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sane-
ions, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1227, 1229 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Regulating Corporate Behavior].
4. For example, the number of civil antitrust actions has remained relatively constant, while
criminal actions have increased dramatically. The ratio was 133:29 in 1968-1970 and 115:89 dur-
ing 1974-1976. M. GoTTFREDSON, M. HINDELANG & N. PARISI, SOURCEBOOK OF CRMINAL JUs-
TICE STATIsTiCS 61 (1977).
5. Regulating Corporate Behavior, supra note 3, at 1229 n.5.
6. The most recent effort to codify the federal criminal code includes a reckless endanger-
ment provision that would apply to corporate conduct. See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
For a discussion of the proposed legislation, see Spurgeon and Fagan, CriminalLiabilityfor Lfe-
Endangering Corporate Conduct, 72 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 400 (1981).
7. H.R. 7040,96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprintedin Corporate CriminalLiability: Hearings
on H.R. 4973 and HR.A 7040 Before the Subcomnm on Crime of the ComnL on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 582-86 (1979-1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. H.R. 7040 provides:
A BILL
To amend title 18 of the United States Code to impose penalties with respect to certain
nondisclosure by business entities as to serious concealed dangers in products and
business practices, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States ofAmerica
in Congress assembled, That chapter 89 of title 18 of the United States Code is amended
by adding at the end the following new section:
"§ 1822 Nondisclosure of serious concealed dangers by certain business entities and
personnel
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"(a) Whoever-
"(1) is a manager with respect to a product or business practice;
"(2) discovers a serious concealed danger that is subject to the regulatory au-
thority of an appropriate Federal agency and is associated with such product (or a
component of that product) or business practice; and
"(3) knowingly fails during the period ending fifteen days after such discovery is
made (or if there is imminent risk of serious bodily injury or death, immediately)-
"(A) to inform an appropriate Federal agency in writing, unless such man-
ager has actual knowledge that such an agency has been so informed; or
"(B) to warn affected employees in writing, unless such manager has actual
knowledge that such employees have been so warned;
shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
but if the convicted defendant is a corporation, such fine shall be not more than
$1,000,000.
"(b) Whoever knowingly discriminates against any person in the terms or conditions
of employment or in retention in employment or in hiring because of such person's hav-
ing informed a Federal agency or warned employees of a serious concealed danger asso-
dated with a product or business practice shall be fined not more than $10,000, or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
"(c) If a fine is imposed on an individual under this section, such fine shall not be
paid, directly or indirectly, out of the assets of any business entity on behalf of that
individual.
"(d) As used in this section-
"(1) the term 'manager' means a person having--
"(A) management authority in or as a business entity; and
"(B) significant responsibility for the safety of a product or business practice
or for the conduct of research or testing in connection with a product or busi-
ness practice;
"(2) the term 'product' includes services;
"(3) the term 'discovers', used with respect to a serious concealed danger, means
obtains information that would convince a reasonable person in the circumstances
in which the discoverer is situated that the serious concealed danger exists;
"(4) the term 'serious concealed danger', used with respect to a product or busi-
ness practice, means that the normal or reasonably foreseeable use of, or the expo-
sure of a human being to, such product or business practice is likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury to a human being (including a human fetus) and the danger
is not readily apparent to the average person;
"(5) the term 'serious bodily injury' means an impairment of physical condition,
including physical pain, that-
"(A) creates a substantial risk of death; or
"(B) causes-
"(i) serious permanent disfigurement;
"(ii) unconsciousness;
"(iii) extreme pain; or
"(iv) permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty;
"(6) the term 'warn affected employees' means give sufficient description of the
serious concealed danger to all individuals working for or in the business entity who
are likely to be subject to the serious concealed danger in the course of that work to
make those individuals aware of that danger, and
"(7) the term 'appropriate Federal agency' means the Federal agency on the
following list which has regulatory authority with respect to the product or business
practice and serious concealed dangers of the sort discovered:
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Criminal Code to impose criminal liability for the manager8 of a busi-
ness entity knowingly9 to fail to report to an appropriate federal
agency, or to warn affected employees, of a serious concealed danger
associated with a business product or practice.10
This Note evaluates the proposed statute. Part I examines the
problems that prompted the legislative proposal. Part II analyzes the
statutory language in light of the statute's purpose. Part III discusses
constitutional limitations on the proposal. Finally, Part IV suggests al-
ternative means by which to effectuate the legislative purpose.
I. THE CAUSE FOR CONCERN
Several incidents provided the impetus for H.R. 7040.11 These inci-
dents can be divided into three categories: occupational harms, threats
to consumer safety, and dangers to the environment.12
Millions of Americans are exposed to health hazards in the work-
place. For example, exposure to asbestos dust 3 causes at least four
"(A) The Food and Drug Administration.
"(B) The Environmental Protection Agency.
"(C) The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
"(D) The Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
"(E) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
"(F) The Consumer Product Safety Commission.
"(G) The Federal Aviation Administration.
"(H) The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.".
SEC. 2 The table of sections for chapter 89 of title 18 of the United States Code is
amended by adding at the end the following new item:
"1822. Nondisclosure of serious concealed dangers by certain business entities and
personneL".
8. See notes 44-75 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 83-105 infra and accompanying text.
10. See note 77 infra.
11. The bill's drafters cited the following incidents: Buffalo Creek (collapse of mine waste
dam); Firestone 500 (defective tires); Ford Pinto (defective gasoline tank); Kepone (hazardous
pesticide discharged into river); Love Canal (leaching of chemical residue); Metropolitan Edison
and Three Mile Island (nuclear reactor accident); Asbestos (occupational exposure to carcinogen);
and Polybrominated Biphenyls (industrial compound in dairy feed). Suncomm. ON CRIME OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., CORPORATE CRIME 10 (Comm.
Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE CRIME].
12. This trichotomy was first articulated in Schrager & Short, Toward a Sociology of Organi-
zational Crime, 25 Soc. PROB. 407, 413 (1978). See also Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 6, at 402.
13. Asbestos is a mineral that separates easily into long, flexible fibers that can be spun,
woven, pressed to form paper, or used as structural reinforcement. It is a valuable commercial
product because of its resistance to heat and chemicals. Nearly one million tons of asbestos are
consumed annually by the United States. An estimated 50,000 workers are involved in the manu-
facture of products containing asbestos. This figure does not include the number of workers in-
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debilitating diseases. 4 Scientists first documented this hazard in
1924.15 Subsequently the asbestos industry conducted an investigation
of the dangers16 that revealed a relationship between exposure to asbes-
tos dust and disease.1" Nevertheless, the industry took few steps to con-
trol the levels of asbestos in its manufacturing plants."' The
government also failed to take any corrective measures until 1970,
when Congress enacted the Occupational Health and Safety Act. 19
Even today, at least 880,000 workers are continually exposed to carcin-
ogens, including asbestos.2"
Publication of an article accusing Ford Motor Company of produc-
ing a car that Ford knew had a defective fuel tank2' helped to reveal a
danger to consumers in 1977. Subsequent federal investigation re-
volved in the secondary manufacture of products containing asbestos. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,652-53
(1975).
14. The diseases are asbestosis, broncogenic carcinoma, mesothelioma, and cancers of the
stomach, colon, and rectum. .d. Asbestosis is a diffuse, interstitial, nonmalignant scarring of the
lungs. Id. at 47,653. See Sweeny, The Asbestosis 2ime Bomb, 14 TRIAL 16 (1978). For a discus-
sion of asbestosis and its effect upon industrial insulation workers, see Selikoff, Bader, Bader,
Churg & Hammond, Asbestosis and Neoplazia, 42 AM. J. MED. 487 (1967). Broncogenic carci-
noma is a malignancy of the lung interior. 40 Fed. Reg. 47,652-53 (1975). Mesothelioma is a
diffuse malignancy of the chest lining or abdomen. Id. at 47,653; Sweeny, supra, at 16.
15. See Cooke, Fibrosis of the Lungs Due to Inhalation ofAsbestos Dust, 1924 BRIT. MED. J.
147.
16. Sweeny, supra note 14, at 17. The study investigated the relationship between the per-
centage of workers diagnosed as having asbestosis and the number of years each worker was
exposed to the substance.
17. The results revealed a positive correlation between the disease and the number of years
the employees had worked. The study recommended that the industry take steps to cure the
problem and further study the effects of asbestos. Id.
18. Id. at 18.
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
20. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 6, at 402.
21. Dowie, Pinto Madness, MomTaR JONES, Sept./Oct. 1977, at 18. The article alleged that
Ford had rushed the Pinto into production despite evidence that rear-end collisions would rupture
the car's fuel tank system. Id Further, the article claimed that Ford had tested three
protective alterations for the gas tank but had used none of them. Ford engineers considered
using the same kind of gas tank used in another Ford model. The other tank had proven success-
ful in over 50 crash tests. The idea was discarded for unknown reasons. Id. at 20-21. Second, the
author claimed to possess a Ford memorandum entitled "Fatalities Associated with Crash-In-
duced Fuel Leakage and Fires" that argued that the company would not benefit financially from
complying with proposed federal fuel tank safety standards in fuel tank design. Id. at 24. Finally,
the article claimed that in the same memorandum, Ford calculated that the costs of making the
fuel tank correction ($11 per car) were not equal to the savings in lives resulting from fires caused
by rear-end collisions. .d. Ford officials have said the allegations are distorted and contain half-
truths. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1977, at A-15; Wheeler, The Public's Costly Mistrust of Cost-
Benefit SafiAnalysis, Nat'l U., Oct. 13, 1980, at 26.
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vealed that even before Ford's introduction of the Pinto, the company
had conducted tests and knew that the gas tank would rupture upon
rear-end collision.22 The jury in Grimshaw v. FordMotor Co. 23 reached
a similar conclusion regarding the Pinto's design and held Ford liable
for gross misconduct in the design and manufacture of the model's fuel
tank system.24 The extent to which Ford knew of the defect was at
issue in Indiana v. Ford Motor Co. ,'s in which Ford was tried on three
counts of reckless homicide26 in connection with the deaths of three
persons in a Pinto crash. The state charged that Ford recklessly
designed, manufactured, and sold the Pinto. Ford's knowledge went
undecided, however, when the jury acquitted Ford on other grounds.
The nuclear reactor accident at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania
(TMI) posed a danger to the environment in 1979. The accident oc-
curred when a pressure valve in the reactor's primary cooling system
failed to close.27 Investigation of the accident showed that the reactor
designers, Babcock & Wilcox, knew that pressure valves similar to the
one used at TMI had malfunctioned previously at nine other nuclear
plants.28 The firm neither warned customers nor alerted operators that
such a malfunction was possible.2 9
H.R. 7040 is the legislative response to these incidents.3" The bill's
22. CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 11, at 10.
23. No. 197761 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County Feb. 6, 1978), aft'd, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757,
174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
24. Schmitt & May, Beyond Products Liability The Legal, Social, and Ethical Problems Fac-
ing the Automobile Industry in Producing Safe Products, 56 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 1021, 1022 (1979).
25. State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Ind. Super. Ct. March 13, 1980).
26. Ford was indicted under IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-5 (Bums Supp. 1980). The statute
states that "a person who recklessly kills another human being commits reckless homicide, a class
C felony." Id. For a discussion of the Pinto case, see Note, Corporate Homicide: A New Assault
on Corporate Decision-Makin& 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 911 (1979).
27. A total of 32,000 gallons of water escaped through an open valve and out the let-down
system. The investigatory commission found that if the valve had closed, or had control operators
closed a backup valve or left the plant's high pressure injection pumps on, the accident never
would have happened. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE
MILE ISLAND, THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI 111 (1979).
28. Id. at 43.
29. Id.
30. Other proposals include S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1617(a) (1979), which states: "A
person is guilty of an offense if he engages in conduct by which he places another person in danger
of imminent death or serious bodily injury." For earlier drafts of this proposal, see Hearings on S.
1453 Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearings on S. I Beore
the Senate C'omnm on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
The American Law Institute also included a life-endangering provision in the Model Penal
Code. Section 201.11 provides: "A person is guilty of reckless conduct if he: (a) recklessly en-
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drafters found that although manufacturing corporations adhered to
federal standards, serious dangers still appeared in products and work-
places. They concluded that these dangers persisted in part because
corporate decisionmakers knowingly allowed worker and consumer ex-
posure to product hazards.31 The proposed statute represents the draft-
ers' attempt to go beyond the civil measures by regulating corporate
behavior through criminal sanctions.
The proposed statute provides that any product or business man-
ager32 who discovers33 a concealed serious danger subject to federal
regulatory authority and who knowingly 34 fails to inform an appropri-
ate federal agency35 or warn affected employees of the danger shall be
fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.36 If the convicted defendant is a corporation, the fine shall be
$1,000,000. 37
The legislative purpose is deterrence.38 The drafters believed that
gages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily
injury... "' MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.11 (rent. Draft No. 9, 1959). See also N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 120.20, .25 (McKinney 1977) (reckless endangerment).
31. Hearings, supra note 7, at 20 (statement of Rep. George Miller).
32. See notes 44-75 infra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 77-83 infra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 84-105 infra and accompanying text.
35. Appropriate federal agencies include the Food and Drug Administration, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. H.R. 7040,
§ l(d)(7) (1980), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 7 at 582, 585-86.
36. The proposal also imposes a fine and prison sentence on any individual who knowingly
discriminates against an employee who reports a serious concealed danger to a federal agency or
who warns affected employees.
37. H.R. 4973, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 7, at 2, was the
precursor of H.R. 7040. It paralleled H.R. 7040, except that a manager had 30 days in which to
report the danger. Id. § l(a)(3). Further, the penalties were "not less than $50,000 or imprison-
ment not less than two years, or both," for an individual, and "if the convicted defendant is a
corporation, such fine shall be not less than $100,000." Id. § l(a).
38. Hearings, supra note 7, at 31. The purposes of criminal sanctions are rehabilitation, inca-
pacitation, retribution, and deterrence. See H. PACKER, THE Limrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCrION
35-41 (1968); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); Regulaling Corporate
Behavior, supra note 3, at 1231.41. Retribution and deterrence are the two rationales for regulat-
ing corporate behavior. Deterrence, however, is the primary rationale because activities pro-
scribed by a statute may not be ethically wrong in the business world. See Glenn, The Crime of
"Pollution"- The Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal Sanctions, 11 AM. CraM. L. REv. 835,
839 (1973); Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 425-26, 436 (1963); Regulating Corporate Behavior, supra
note 3, at 1235.
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the criminal penalties would discourage corporate executives from con-
cealing hazards from workers and consumers.39 The drafters designed
the bill to shift the burden of social responsibility from the government
to private industry.4° They viewed the legislation as redirecting the
business manager's concern for the corporate good to concern for the
public good41 and as addressing general questions of corporate ethics,
individual responsibility, and business morality.42 The drafters also
wanted, however, to limit the scope of the legislation. The bill is not
intended to affect everyone in business but only those subject to the
regulatory authority of eight federal agencies.43
II. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
H.R. 7040 represents an attempt to address the common characteris-
tics of the incidents that prompted the proposal while still encompass-
ing a wide variety of circumstances. The proposed statute premises
liability on three elements. To violate the statute, a person must (1) be
a manager, (2) discover a serious concealed danger, and (3) knowingly
fail to report to an appropriate federal agency or warn affected employ-
ees of the danger.
A. "Manager"
The first requirement for liability under H.R. 7040 is that a person be
a manager. The proposed statute defines manager as a person having
*'management authority in or as a business entity and significant re-
sponsibility for the safety of a product or business practice or for the
39. Hearings, supra note 7, at 31. Representative Miller added: "I think that a person who
aspires to be a leader in corporate America would not want to have a r6sum6 with a criminal
conviction on it." Id. The drafters treat corporate concealment almost as an offense malum in se.
One of the drafters went so far as to declare: "[The decision to conceal hazards] has many of the
components that we learn in law school about forethought, premeditation, calculation, knowingly.
All of those things that we ascribe to criminals who lie in wait in the alleys can be ascribed to some
of these decisions... " Id. at 27.
40. Id. at 19, 21.
41. Id. at 21.
42. Id. at 20. According to Representative Miller, one of the drafters: [This legislation]
raises the fundamentally disturbing question of whether our economic, political, or ethical systems
have somehow become so skewed that the workship of profit is more important than people.
Covering up known hazards from workers and the general public illustrates a moral and ethical
problem which appears with alarming frequency, not just in one industry, but throughout industry
and in our society as a whole. Id at 20-21.
43. Id. at 594. For a list of the eight agencies, see n.7 supra.
Number 2]
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conduct of research or testing in connection with a product or business
practice."'  This definition thus has two elements:45 "management au-
thority" and "significant responsibility" for the safety of a product or
business practice at any one manufacturing stage.
46
The first element presents only slight ambiguity. "Management au-
thority" ordinarily connotes control of corporate policy.47 Stockhold-
44. H.R. 7040,96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1(d),reprintedin Hearings, supra note 7, at 582, 584-86.
By defining "manager" to include a business entity, the drafters created corporate criminal re-
sponsibility for an individual employee's failure to report the discovery of a serious concealed
danger. The drafters achieve this responsibility by imputing the acts and intent of individuals
within the corporation to the corporate entity.
The theory adopts the agency doctrine of tort law, respondeat superior. See Regulating Corpo-
rate Behavior, supra note 3, at 1247. Under this doctrine, a corporation will be criminally liable if
its agent commits an illegal act proscribed by the statute within the scope of his employment. See,
eg., United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 1979); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. United States,
406 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hougland Barge Line, Inc., 387 F. Supp. I 110,
1114 (W.D. Pa. 1974). The acts of officers, who are viewed as an extension of the corporate entity,
are most often imputed to the corporation. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 941-42
(6th Cir. 1963); United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16, 20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 959 (1949); Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir.), cer. denied, 326
U.S. 734 (1945). The scope of liability, however, extends to include middle-level management.
See eg., United States v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1975) (general foreman); United
States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970) (sales man-
ager), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th
Cir. 1960) (depot manager); United States v. Milton Marks Corp., 240 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957)
(general foreman); United States v. Steiner Plastics Mfg. Co., 231 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1956) (produc-
tion manager); United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948) (managers, assistant
managers, and salesmen). In certain instances, it includes subordinate employees. See, e.g.,
United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239 (1938) (employee who unloaded cattle from
carriers); United States v. Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., 464 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1972) (truck
driver); Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1963) (truck driver); Riss
& Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1958) (terminal log clerk); St. Johnsbury Trucking
Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 393 (Ist Cir. 1955) (rate clerk); United States v. George F. Fish,
Inc., 154 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.) (salesclerk), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946); Dollar S.S. Co. v. United
States (The President Coolidge), 101 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939) (crew member).
45. Hearings, supra note 7, at 613.
46. Under H.R. 4973, "manager" was defined to mean:
[A] person having management authority in or as a business entity with respect to a
particular product or business practice, if such authority extends to informing Federal
agencies and such business entity's personnel about serious dangers associated with such
product (or any component of such product) or such business practice ....
H.R. 4973, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b)(1) (1979), reprintedin Hearings, supra note 7, at 2-3. The
definition under H.R. 7040, which adds the requirement of significant responsibility, eliminates
much of the detail of the language in H.R. 4973 and makes the scope of the term "manager"
broader. H.R. 7040, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § l(d)(1) (1980), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 7, at
582, 584.
47. See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), a7'd,
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ers48 and corporate agents49 can exercise management authority.
Generally, however, only the board of directors and officers possess the
authority to exercise corporate judgment and discretion. 0
The drafters adopted the element of "significant responsibility" from
two Supreme Court decisions5' that defined the term as used in the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.52 In United States v. Dotterweich5 the
government charged a corporation and its president with violating the
Act.54 The individual defendant argued that he should be acquitted
because he had not possessed the requisite intent nor personally partici-
pated in the violation. The Court held that the jury was entitled to
determine Dotterweich's guilt because the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act lacked the traditional requirement that the defendant be aware of
having engaged in wrongdoing." Instead, the Act provided that "a
person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a
public danger"56 could also be liable.57
436 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971); W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2096, at 398 (rev. perm. ed. 1976).
48. Union Pac. Ry. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 163 U.S. 564, 596 (1896) (powers vested in
stockholders when charter fails to designate another); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v.
City Ice & Coal Co., 216 N.C. 6, 9, 3 S.E.2d 290, 292 (1939) (ultimate control in stockholders).
49. Authority to agents is generally delegated by the board of directors. W. FLETCHER, supra
note 47, § 665, at 831-32. The Model Business Corporation Act provides that "[a]ll officers and
agents of the corporation... shall have such authority and perform such duties in the manage-
ment of the corporation ...." MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 50 (1979).
50. Schein v. Caesar's World, Inc., 491 F.2d 17, 18 (5th Cir.) (corporate management vested
in board of directors by statute), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974); Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d
1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 1972) (officers and directors manage corporate affairs); Phoenix Say. & Loan,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 1970) (corporate management vested in
board of directors by corporate charter).
Some state corporation laws explicitly designate the board of directors as managers of corporate
affairs. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.09 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney
Supp. 1981). Some courts have interpreted such statutes as giving directors undelegated and abso-
lute power. See, e.g., In re Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 6 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1925); Hillcrest
Inv. Co. v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 147, 149 (W.D. Mo. 1944), af'd, 147 F.2d 194 (8th Cir.
1945). One author argues that the word "power" in the decisions means only that the board of
directors has authority to formulate policy according to stockholder wishes and not that actual
corporate control is vested in the board. See Note, Shareholder Paricipation in Management, 40
VA. L. REv. 901, 903.04 (1954).
51. Hearings, supra note 7, at 613.
52. 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (1976).
53. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
54. Id. at 278.
55. Id. at 279-81.
56. Id. at 281.
57. Id.
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Although the Dollerweich Court indicated that the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act altered the normal principles of criminal responsibility,-"
the Court left two questions unanswered. 9 First, the Court failed to
decide whether the Act created vicarious or strict liability for the indi-
vidual defendant.60 Second, the Court failed to define whom the Act
included in the class of persons having a sufficiently responsible rela-
tion to the transaction to incur liability.6"
In UnitedStates v. Park62 the Court attempted to resolve these issues.
In Park the government charged a retail food store chain6" and its chief
executive officer, Park, with violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. Although Park had delegated responsibility for sanitation to lower
level employees, the Court affirmed the jury's verdict of guilty against
him.64
The Court reexamined Dotterweich, resolving the first unanswered
issue in that case by adopting a standard of strict liability.65 Chief Jus-
tice Burger, writing for the majority, interpreted the Food, Drug, and
58. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is a public welfare statute. Public welfare statutes are
regulatory statutes, and violation of them is punishable without a showing of criminal intent.
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 55-56 (1933). Public welfare statutes differ
from true criminal statutes because they are essentially regulatory and carry light penalties.
Designed to make regulations more effective, penal sanctions are merely adjunctive to civil en-
forcement. See Sayre, CriminalResponsibilipfor theActs of4nother, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 717-
19 (1930).
59. See 13 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 299, 302-03 (1975); 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 431, 436-37 (1976).
60. The dissent argued that the majority had created a vicarious liability standard. 320 U.S.
at 286-87. Accord, O'Keefe & Shapiro, Personal Criminal Liabilit Under the Food, Drug and
Cosmeticlct-The Dotterweich Doctrine, 30 FOOD, DRUG & CosM. L.. 5, 5-8 (1975); Dauphinai,
Vicarious Criminal Liabli&y Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 11 FooD, DRUG &
CosM. L.J. 398, 408-11 (1956). But see 12 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 366 (1944).
61. Subsequent cases also failed to relieve the confusion. Cases applying the Doiterweich
doctrine required a finding that the individual defendant directed or personally participated in the
violation. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 409 (1962) (officer. who actively pro-
moted illegal scheme liable under Sherman Act); Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613,
618-19 (1949) (president of company charged with knowingly filing false invoices participated in
scheme); United States v. H.B. Gregory Co., 502 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 1974) (corporate president
also personally responsible for federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act violation), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1007 (1975); United States v. Hohensee, 243 F.2d 367, 370 (3d Cir.) (defendant distributed
pamphlets constituting misbranding of drugs), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 976 (1957). See also Note,
Individual Liability ofAgentsfor Corporate Crimes Under the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 31
VAND. L. REV. 965, 983-84 (1978); 13 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 299, 303-04 (1975).
62. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
63. Acme Markets, Inc. was the named chain in question.
64. Defendants were charged with allowing food in an Acme Markets, Inc. warehouse to
become adulterated in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (1976).
65. 421 U.S. at 673.
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Cosmetic Act as requiring a corporate officer not only to prevent viola-
tions but to seek out and correct them.66
The Court also looked to Dotterweich's second unresolved issue.
Dotterweich indicated that all responsible officials could be held liable
for a violation of the Act.67 Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Park
attempted to delineate with more precision the class of responsible of-
ficers. The Chief Justice indicated that all individuals carrying out the
corporate purpose with the responsibility and authority to guarantee
compliance with the Act are persons in a responsible relationship to the
transaction.68 The Park majority did recognize, however, that the re-
sponsible agent could claim that he was powerless to prevent or correct
the violation. 9 Subsequent cases have construed this recognition as
creating an affirmative defense,7" requiring a defendant to show that he
exercised extraordinary care and still could not prevent the violation.71
66. Id. at 672.
67. The Doiterweich Court stated that the question of responsibility was to be decided "on
the evidence produced at the trial and its submission-assuming the evidence warrants it-to the
jury under appropriate guidance." 320 U.S. at 284-85.
68. The majority noted that liability was not restricted to a single corporate agent or em-
ployee. 421 U.S. at 672.
Subsequent cases have followed Park's responsible relation test. See, e.g., United States v.
Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1130 n.l I (3d Cir. 1979) (individuals convicted for violation of
Water Pollution Control Act), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); United States v. Acri Wholesale
Grocery Co., 409 F. Supp. 529, 535 (S.D. Iowa 1976) (individual defendants had requisite respon-
sibility and authority under Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 408
F. Supp. 450,471 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (president liable under Mandatory Petroleum Allocation Regu-
lations although he did not "own, operate or control the operation of one or more refineries").
For further discussion of the Park case, see Note, supra note 61, at 985-88; 13 Am. CraM. L.
Rv. 299, 304-16 (1975); 37 Otro ST. L.J. 431, 439-50 (1976).
69. 421 U.S. at 673.
70. See, eg., United States v. New England Grocers Supply, 488 F. Supp. 230, 234-35 (D.
Mass. 1980). Accord, United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512, 515-16 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 510-12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976).
The first case to recognize the impossibility defense was United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse
Co., 376 U.S. 86 (1964), in which the government charged a public storage warehouseman with
violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (1976). The Court implied that
an officer who demonstrated that he exercised extraordinary care and still could not prevent the
violation might not be culpable under the Act. 376 U.S. at 91. The elements of the possible
defense have yet to be satisfied. The Y Hata and Starr cases suggest that a corporate officer
would have to show he identified conditions leading to a violation, took steps to correct them, and
attempted to implement alternatives. See Regulating Corporate Behavior, supra note 3, at 1263-64.
United States v. Corbin Farm Service, 444 F. Supp. 510, 536 (E.D. Cal. 1976), aft'd, 578 F.2d
259 (9th Cir. 1978), extended the impossibility defense to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918,
§ 6, 16 U.S.C. § 707 (1976).
71. The evidentiary requirements under the impossibility defense are unclear.
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The drafters of H.R. 7040 went beyond the first issue in Dolterweich
and Park by requiring that a manager have actual knowledge of a de-
fect or danger before'liability attaches. 72 They fully adopted, however,
the responsible relationship test developed in Dotterweich and Park.
73
The drafters' reliance on the two decisions as a definitional basis for
those subject to liability under H.R. 7040 was misplaced. First, the
proposed statute's description of those individuals standing in a respon-
sible relationship to the violative activity is imprecise. The Park Court
had stated that corporate title in itself is insufficient to create liability;
instead, liability should be predicated on the defendant's active author-
ity and responsibility to prevent or correct the activity.74 Ordinarily,
however, that authority and responsibility is a feature of one's corpo-
rate position. Thus, courts still may tend to find liability by merely
looking at a defendant's corporate title.75 H.R. 7040 makes this possi-
bility more likely by defining a manager as one with "management au-
thority, ' 76 a term that denotes the authority vested in the board of
directors and officers.
Should a court look beyond a defendant's title, the availability in
H.R. 7040 prosecutions of the powerless defense articulated in the Park
case is questionable. Although a defendant could maintain that he
identified a danger but was powerless to correct it, the bill adds a
knowledge requirement not found in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. Thus, a prosecutor could still obtain a conviction by demonstrat-
72. Hearings, supra note 7, at 654 (remarks of Rep. Conyers).
73. Id. at 613.
74. 421 U.S. at 675.
75. See 37 OHIo ST. L.J. 431, 445-46 (1976). The dissent in Park claimed that the term
"responsibility" had been given no content by the majority. The dissent stated:
Requiring... a verdict of guilty upon a finding of "responsibility," [the jury] instruc-
tion standing alone could have been construed as a direction to convict if the jury found
Park "responsible" for the condition in the sense that his position as chief executive
officer gave him formal responsibility within the structure of the corporation. But the
trial judge went on specifically to caution the jury not to attach such a meaning to his
instruction .... "Responsibility" as used by the trial judge therefore had whatever
meaning the jury in its unguided discretion chose to give it.
The instructions, therefore, expressed nothing more than a tautology. They told the
jury: "You must find the defendant guilty if you find that he is to be held accountable
for this adulterated food." In other words, "You must find the defendant guilty if you
conclude that he is guilty."
421 U.S. at 679 (Stewart, J., dissenting).




ing that the defendant, despite his efforts, knowingly failed to report the
danger to the appropriate federal agency.
B. 'Discovers"
H.R. 7040's second element requires that a manager discover a seri-
ous concealed danger." The bill defines "discover" as obtaining infor-
mation that, under the circumstances, would convince a reasonable
person that the serious concealed danger exists. 8 The definition re-
quires that a manager actually know of the existence of a serious con-
cealed danger before a duty to report arises.79 Neither suspicion 80 nor
hearsay8 is sufficient to give rise to the duty.
This limited scope of the term "discover" is inconsistent, however,
with the legislative purpose of deterrence underlying the bill. The pro-
posed statute may insulate corporate executives who should know of a
danger by virtue of their position but who do not have actual knowl-
edge of it. Furthermore, the actual knowledge requirement prevents
the bill from reaching one with knowledge under the rule of wilful
blindness, which states that one is deemed to have knowledge when he
suspects a fact is probable but refrains from determining its actual truth
because he wants to deny knowledge of it.82 This rule could apply
under H.R. 7040 when, for example, a manager receives an internal
corporate safety report but deliberately refuses to read it. This inter-
pretation of "discovers" would be consistent with the legislative pur-
pose of deterring deliberate concealment of known dangers.
Nonetheless, the requirement of actual knowledge precludes the bill
from reaching this type of knowledge.
C. 'nowingly"
The final element of H.R. 7040 requires that a manager "knowingly"
77. "Serious concealed danger" is defined to mean "that the normal or reasonably forseeable
use of, or the exposure of human beings to, such product or business practice is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury to a human being (including a human fetus) and the danger is not
readily apparent to the average person." Id. § l(d)(4), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 7, at 582,
584-85.
78. Id. § l(d)(3), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 7, at 582, 584.
79. Hearings, supra note 7, at 654.
80. Id. at 596.
81. Id. at 654.
82. See R PERKINS, CRIINAL LAW 776 (2d ed. 1969); G. WILMS, CRUMrNAL LAW:. Tim
GENERAL PART § 57 (2d ed. 1961).
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
616 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:603
fail to report discovery of a danger to an appropriate federal agency or
to warn affected employees.8 3 The drafters were concerned that corpo-
rate executives made calculated decisions to expose workers or con-
sumers to health hazards.8 4  Under the proposed statute, such a
decision would constitute a knowing failure to report to the appropriate
federal agency. The proposed statute does not, however, provide a gen-
eral definition of the word "knowingly."8 " The drafters employed the
term "wilfully" in the legislative history, equating the term with a man-
ager's conscious decision to sell a defective product or disregard a haz-
ardous workplace.86 The drafters may have intended to use
"knowingly" and "wilfully" interchangeably.
Although some jurists use them interchangeably,8 7 the terms can
have different meanings. "Knowingly" suggests a person's awareness
that his conduct is of a certain nature or will cause a certain result.88
"Wilfully" connotes a wrongful purpose. In United States v. Mur-
dock,89 the Supreme Court defined a wilful act as one done with "bad
purpose, without justifiable excuse,. . . a thing done without ground
for believing it is lawful or conduct marked by careless disregard of
whether or not one has the right so to act."90 Thus, "wilfuly" suggests
a greater presence of evil motive.
H.R. 7040 requires only a "knowing" failure to report. The legisla-
tive history, however, indicates that the proposed statute was intended
to deter active concealment of health hazards to promote corporate
profits at the expense of health and safety."' Furthermore, H.R. 7040
83. H.R. 7040, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § l(a)(3)(A), reprinted in Hearings, MsrVra note 7, at 582,
583.
84. Hearings, supra note 7, at 20.
85. The drafters rejected using a broader reckless endangerment standard. Id. at 26.
86. Id. at 20.
87. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment 10, at 130 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
88. The Model Penal Code defines "knowingly" in the following manner:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(1) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circum-
stances, he knows that his conduct is of that nature or he knows of the existence of such
circumstances; and
(2) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he knows that his conduct will
necessarily cause such a result.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
89. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
90. Id. at 394. See also United States v. Heilman, 614 F.2d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 1980); Sher-
man v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 747, 753-54 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp.
463, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
91. Hearings, supra note 7, at 20-21.
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was intended to reach only those enterprises subject to certain regula-
tory authority.92 The incidents that give rise to H.R. 70401 suggest
that the bill was aimed at businesses affecting a large number of indi-
viduals. Thus, the statutory language would comport more fully with
the legislative purpose if the term "wilfully" were construed in con-
junction with the term "knowingly." A "knowing and wilful failure to
report" would be one in which the actor was aware of his activities and
yet consciously chose to violate the reporting requirement. Predicating
liability on a manager's knowing and wilful failure to report a defect or
danger would promote the bill's objective of deterring only those who
actively conceal a discovered hazard that they recognize as a possible
violation of health or safety regulations.
The drafters' use of the term "knowingly" as the third element of
liability under H.R. 7040 raises a second question concerning the scope
of the proposed statute. Although ignorance or mistake of law gener-
ally is no defense to a violation,9 4 a line of decisions interpreting
"knowingly" under the Bank Secrecy Act95 suggests that an exception
to this doctrine is available for reporting statutes.
In United States v. San Juan96 the Second Circuit reversed the con-
viction of a woman who allegedly violated the Bank Secrecy Act. The
statute provided that anyone who knowingly transported more than
$5000 across the United States border had to file a report with the At-
torney General.97 The court dismissed the indictment because the
Government failed to establish that the defendant had knowledge of
92. Id. at 594.
93. See note I I supra.
94. R. PERKINs, supra note 81, at 920. Ignorance or mistake of law is a defense if the defend-
ant can show reliance on (1) a statute thereafter held unconstitutional, (2) a decision thereafter
overruled, or (3) incorrect legal advice given by an officer authorized by law to advise the public
on such matters. Id. at 926-28. See also W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
366-68 (1972).
95. 31 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976).
96. 545 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1976).
97. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, § 231, 31 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976), provides in part:
Whoever... knowingly-
(1) transports or causes to be transported monetary instruments-
(A) from any place within the United States to or through any place outside the
United States, or
(B) to any place within the United States from or through any place outside the
United States,...
in an amount exceeding $5,000 on any one occasion shall file a report or reports in
accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
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the reporting statute. 98
The Fifth Circuit, interpreting the same statute in United States v.
Granda,99 similarly defined "knowingly" to require a showing that the
defendant actually knew of the reporting requirement.'0 The court
reasoned that no useful purpose would be served by prosecuting viola-
tors who have no knowledge of the reporting requirement.' 0 ' In a sub-
sequent case,102 the court further explained that an acknowledged
general awareness of currency laws did not satisfy the "knowingly"
standard.103 The court held that knowledge of the statute was
necessary.1°4
A similar interpretation of "knowingly" might be available for H.R.
7040. Liability under H.R. 7040, like that under the currency reporting
statute, is predicated on a failure to report. Furthermore, unlike a
crime such as theft, in which the legal questions are ancillary to the
material element of the crime,0 5 knowledge of the reporting require-
ment under H.R. 7040 is a material and legal element of the offense.
Thus, in the case of theft, ignorance of the law should not be a defense
because knowledge of the law is not an element of the crime. The
"knowingly" requirement of H.R. 7040, however, makes awareness of
98. 545 F.2d at 318.
99. 565 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1978). Defendant had been convicted of knowingly transporting
$10,000 from Panama to the United States in violation of the Bank Secrecy Act. Id. at 923. The
court overturned the conviction on the ground that it was impossible to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant knowingly failed to report that she transported the money. Id. at 926-27.
100. Id. at 926. Accord, United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 890 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Rodriguez, 592 F.2d 553, 557 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir. 1978). But ef United States v. Tolkow, 532 F.2d 853,
858 (2d Cir. 1976) (court read congressional intent to construe the word "knowingly" in the Wel-
fare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836,72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed 1976), not
to require actual knowledge of the reporting requirement). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02,
Comment 11, at 131 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (requiring statute that makes knowledge of the law
an element of the offense to provide so "plainly").
101. 565 F.2d at 926.
102. United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1978). Defendant had been con-
victed of making a false statement to a government official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976)
and of knowingly failing to file a report that he transported over $5000 into the United States in
violation of the Bank Secrecy Act. Id. at 1208. The court overturned the conviction on the
ground that defendant did not have the requisite intent under either statute. 1d. at 1213.
103. Id.
104. Id. See United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 890 (5th Cir.) (persons must be specifi-
cally warned), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 926 (5th
Cir. 1978) (suggesting government could provide notice by adding sentence to customs declaration
form).
105. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment 12, at 131 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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the law an element of the H.R. 7040 offense, and ignorance of the law
might therefore be an appropriate defense in an H.R. 7040 prosecution.
The statutory language thus is deficient in several ways. First, by
defining a manager as a person with management authority and signifi-
cant responsibility, H.R. 7040 may delimit the scope of liable persons
more narrowly than the drafters intended. Second, the definition of
"discovers" is also restrictive. Requiring actual knowledge may allow
potential violators to insulate themselves from the proposed statute's
effects. Finally, when the term "knowingly" is not used in conjunction
with the term "wilfully," the last requirement for liability fails to serve
the statutory purpose of deterrence.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
By requiring a corporate officer or agent to report a serious con-
cealed defect or danger, H.R. 7040 forces an individual to disclose in-
formation that might later be used against him in a criminal
prosecution for violation of federal health and safety regulations. This
requirement raises the question of whether H.R. 7040 is limited by the
fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.10 6
The Supreme Court has addressed the effect of the privilege against
self-incrimination on statutes with corporate reporting and disclosure
provisions. The privilege is personal and cannot be asserted by a cor-
poration.'0 7 Moreover, corporate officers obliged to allow inspection of
corporate records cannot invoke it.'0 8 Under some statutory require-
106. "No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
." U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
The constitutional privilege applies only in criminal prosecutions. See Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). Fear of coerced confessions is
the usual reason given for allowing the privilege. Hoffman, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion and Immunity Statutes: Permissible Uses of Immunized Testimony, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 421,
427-28 (1980).
107. See, eg., Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 289 (1968); Baltimore & O.R.R.
v. I.C.C., 221 U.S. 612, 622 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906); United States v. 3963
Bottles, 265 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959).
108. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 8 (1948); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 196 (1946); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 726 (1944);
Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 490 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 376
(1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906).
The fifth amendment privilege does apply to oral testimony concerning the location of union
records held by a custodian. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957). See generally
Fraser, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination as Applied to Custodians of Organizational
Records, 33 WAsH. L. REv. & STATE BJ. 435 (1958).
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ments, however, corporate officers and agents can assert the privilege
when required to report certain information.
In United States v. Sullivan"° the Supreme Court held that the fifth
amendment privilege could not be used as a defense in a prosecution
for failure to file an income tax return.110 Sullivan's return would have
revealed that his income was derived in part from violations of the Na-
tional Prohibition Act. The Court noted in dictum that defendant
could have objected to the incriminating disclosure on the return but
could not refuse completely to fie the return.11'
Thirty-eight years later, in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Board"2 the Court held that the registration requirements of the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act of 19501 13 were inconsistent with the fifth
amendment.' 14 The Act required members of "Communist-front" or-
ganizations to register, under certain circumstances, with the United
States Attorney General.11 The Court found that the registration re-
quirements created obvious risks of incrimination because the admis-
sion of membership could be used as evidence in a subsequent
prosecution under the Smith Act.' 6
The Albertson Court distinguished Sullivan by noting that the ques-
tions on the income tax form were neutral and not directed to any par-
ticular segment of the population.117 The registration requirements in
Albertson, by contrast, were directed at a group "inherently suspect of
criminal activities.""' 8 Moreover, the area of inquiry in Sullivan was
regulatory, while the one in Albertson was "permeated with criminal
statutes."" 9 The Alberison Court, in determining that the risk of in-
crimination was intolerable, stressed three factors: (1) the area of in-
109. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
110. Id. at 263.
111. Id
112. 382 U.S. 70 (1965). Members of the Communist Party were prosecuted for violating the
Subversive Activities Control Act by failing to report to the Attorney General as required by the
Act. Id. at 73. For a discussion of the Albertson decision, see Mansfield, The Albertson Case:
Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Government's Needfor Informa-
tion, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 103.
113. Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987, 993-95 (1950) (repealed 1968).
114. 382 U.S. at 78.
115. 64 Stat. at 993.
116. 382 U.S. at 77.






quiry within which the reporting requirement was promulgated, (2) the
nature of the information requested, and (3) the characteristics of the
individuals from whom the information was requested.
In Marchetti v. United States.. and Grosso v. United States-1 the
Court again emphasized these factors in upholding, on the basis of the
privilege against self-incrimination, defendants' failures to comply with
a taxation and registration requirement for persons engaged in ac-
cepting wagers." The Court declared that the issue was not whether
the United States could tax unlawful activities but whether the methods
that the tax employed created a real and appreciable danger of incrimi-
nation.1 3 The Court found that such a danger existed in Marchetti and
Grosso because wagering was an area "permeated with criminal stat-
utes."' 24 Furthermore, the group in question was "inherently sus-
pect." 125 These cases suggest that reporting requirements directed at
the public at large to further legitimate government purposes do not
violate the fifth amendment privilege. By contrast, the fifth amend-
ment may sanction a failure to report when the area of inquiry is per-
120. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). Petitioner had been convicted of conspiring to evade the payment of
an occupational tax related to wagers in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4411 (1976) and of failing to
register as required under 26 U.S.C. § 4412 (1976). 390 U.S. at 40.
121. 390 U.S. 62 (1968). Petitioner had been convicted of the same offense as the petitioner in
Marchetti.
122. Grosso, 390 U.S. at 71; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 60. The Court overruled United States v.
Lewis, 348 U.S. 419 (1955), and United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), to the extent that
those two cases disallowed the privilege in the context of registration and occupational tax re-
quirements. Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67; Marcheti, 390 U.S. at 54. The Court rejected the argument
that the privilege was waived merely because those "inherently suspect of criminal activities" had
been told to choose between ceasing wagering or providing information. Id. at 52. Further, the
Court rejected the argument that because the privilege offers protection for only past acts, it could
not apply to the prospective requirements of the taxing statute. Id. at 53. The Court characterized
the argument as "hinged on an excessively narrow view of the scope of the.. . privilege." Id. at
52.
123. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 44-49.
Whether a "real and appreciable" danger of self-incrimination exists depends upon whether the
possibility of such incrimination is "[within] the ordinary course of the law and such as [a] reason-
able man would be affected by [it]." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896). Cf. Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (protection limited to situations in which witness has
"reasonable cause" to apprehend a danger); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375 (1951)
(danger of incrimination more than a "mere imaginary possibility"); Blau v. United States, 340
U.S. 159, 161 (1950) (answers furnish a "link in the chain of evidence"); Heike v. United States,
227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913) (protection does not extend to a "remote possibility" of incrimination).
124. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 47.
125. Id. For further discussion of Marcheti, see Note, The Marchetti.Approach to Self-Incrim-
ination in Cases Involying Tax and Registration Statutes, 56 MINN. L. REv. 229 (1971).
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
622 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
meated by criminal statutes, when the information disclosed may be
used to facilitate a criminal prosecution, and when the questions are
directed at a highly select group of individuals.
The Court had a further opportunity to develop the relationship be-
tween reporting statutes and the fifth amendment when it upheld sec-
tion 2002(a)(1) of the California Motor Vehicle Code. 126 The statute
required any motor vehicle driver involved in an accident resulting in
property damage to stop and give the other party his name and address.
In California v. Byers'2 7 the Court found that this requirement created
no substantial risk of incrimination. The Court failed, however, to for-
mulate a definitive rule governing reporting statutes.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, enunciated a balanc-
ing test to be used in evaluating the constitutionality of the statute. The
test, an objective standard, weighs the public need for information
against the probability that the information will be used in a criminal
prosecution. 121 Considering the factors in Albertson, Marchetti, and
Grosso-the nature of the information requested, the characteristics of
the group required to report, and the area of inquiry-in the balancing
process, Chief Justice Burger concluded that most of the people driving
automobiles in California were not inherently suspect of criminal activ-
ities. 129 Moreover, the Chief Justice found that very few of those who
complied with the statute would face any substantial risk of
incrimination.' °
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion suggested a different balancing
test, one considering the individual's personal privilege against self-in-
126. CAL. Va-t. CODE § 20002(a)(1) (Deering 1972).
127. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
128. Id. at 427. The Chief Justice stated:
Whenever the Court is confronted with the question of a compelled disclosure that has
an incriminating potential the judicial scrutiny is invariably a close one. Tension be-
tween the State's demand for disclosures and the protection of the right against self-
incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions. Inevitably these must be resolved
in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to
constitutional protections on the other ....
Id.
129. Id. at 430-31.
130. Id. Though the Chief Justice grounded his test on a permissible premise, he failed to
consider the risk to the individual. He concluded that because the disclosures were less incrimi-
nating with regard to some statutes, the privilege was limited accordingly. His standard thus tests
the privilege statistically and moves away from the notion that the privilege is a personal one. See
86 HARv. L. REv. 914, 919 (1973).
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crimination. 13 1 Justice Harlan's proposal would balance the risk of in-
fringing the individual's interest against self-incrimination against the
government's interest in the reporting requirement. 132 If the dangers of
incrimination outweighed the need for reporting, the test would con-
sider the possible impact of a grant of immunity on the government's
prosecutorial interest.1 33
Stressing the nature of the event giving rise to the reporting require-
ment and the amount of detail required in the disclosures, Justice
Harlan agreed that the statute was constitutional. 134  He concluded,
first, that the defendant's personal interest was less substantial1 35 than
the state's interest in promoting financial responsibility with respect to
automobile accidents.' 36 Second, he concluded that the overall report-
ing scheme precluded imposition of a use immunity.137
Because decisions subsequent to Byers have failed to clarify the issue
further, 3 the application of Byers to H.R. 7040 produces unclear re-
131. 402 U.S. at 437 (Harlan, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 434-58 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan found the balancing approach nec-
essary, for although the individual's interest is important, the government has an interest in the
reporting requirement based on its obligation to respond adequately to societal needs. Id. at 451-
53,
133. The use restriction is not one of the primary factors. Instead, this factor comes into play
only after the other interests have been balanced. This is consistent with the Court's practice of
not deciding an immunity question until it decides the applicability of the privilege. See Meltzer,
Privileges 4gainst Self-Incrimination and the Hit-and-Rum Opinions, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 17.
134. 402 U.S. at 458 (Harlan, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 454-58 (Harlan, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 450-51 (Harlan, J., concurring).
137. Justice Harlan was skeptical of use immunity because ifit were provided, the state would
have to prove that it "could have selected [the defendant] out from the general citizenry. . . even
if he had not [complied]." In most cases this showing would be impossible. Id. at 444 n.4 (Harlan,
J., concurring).
Furthermore, when Byers was decided no court had defined the limits of use immunity. See
Comment, Reporting Illegal Gains as Taxable Income: A Compromise Solution to a Prosecutorial
Windfall, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 111, 124 (1974). In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972),
however, the Supreme Court held that full transactional immunity need not be granted a witness
before he is compelled to disclose information. Id. at 463. Rather, a statute may confer use im-
munity that requires the prosecution to show only that the evidence it proffers is derived from a
source independent of the compelled testimony. Id. at 459. The scope of the immunity thus is co-
extensive with the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 458.
138. In Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the convic-
tion of a defendant who disclosed gambling as his source of income on his tax return. The Court
found that defendant had a right to claim the privilege only at the time of filing. Id. at 665.
In United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), the Supreme Court completely sidestepped the
issue. The defendant was charged with violating the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 311 (1976), which prohibited the discharge of oil into navigable waters. Defendant,
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suits. Under Chief Justice Burger's analysis, the privilege would not
attach because the disclosures that H.R. 7040 requires are not unusu-
ally incriminating. The proposed statute has a legitimate deterrent pur-
pose and is not aimed at an inherently suspect group of individuals.139
Cases arising under H.R. 7040 would be distinguishable from Byers.
Unlike the statute in Byers, H.R. 7040 applies to an area permeated
with criminal statutes. 140 Moreover, the Byers statute required the mo-
torist to report only his name and address. Under H.R. 7040, the man-
ager must reveal not only his name and address but also that his
corporation is manufacturing a defective product or maintaining a dan-
gerous workplace. The likelihood of self-incrimination is
substantial.141
The Harlan two-step analysis would find that the proposal violates
the fifth amendment. A disclosing manager must take a substantial risk
of self-incrimination. Unlike the California statute at issue in Byers,
H.R. 7040 requires detailed disclosures. Such detail could help the
government meet its burden in a case against the individual for violat-
lessee of an oil drilling facility, reported a discharge as required by § 311(b)(5) of the Act, and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used the report to support a showing of a substantive
violation. 448 U.S. at 246. It fined defendant pursuant to § 31 1(b)(6) of the Act. Id. at 247.
Defendant contended that the reporting requirement of § 31 1(b)(5) as used to support a civil
penalty under § 31 l(b)(6) violated his right against self-incrimination. Id. The Court construed
the penalty as civil and held that the fifth amendment did not apply. Id. at 254-55.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that the statutory purpose should govern whether the fifth
amendment privilege could be invoked. Id. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting). If a reporting statute
required information from a limited group of people "engaged in criminal activity in order to
facilitate their prosecution and conviction," Justice Stevens would allow the defendant to assert
the privilege. If, however, the statute required disclosure to facilitate regulatory objectives, the
fact that the information might incriminate a particular person would not be sufficient to allow the
invocation of the privilege. .d. at 258. Justice Stevens found the penalties sufficiently criminal to
raise the question whether the statute is a proper one for allowing the privilege to attach. Id. at
259.
139. A similar argument was made by Professor Louis Seidman. See Hearings, supra note 7,
at 670-71. Professor Seidman argued further that the fifth amendment "is normally thought of as
a restriction on the way that the Government proves a crime after the crime has occurred. But
H.R. 7040 is designed to regulate ongoing conduct. It concerns not proof that social harm already
occurred; but prevention of social harm which is about to occur." d. at 670.
140. See, ag., Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1976); Oc-
cupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1976); the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 303, 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1976).
141. Compare the facts of the Ward case, which is discussed in note 138 supra. After Ward
complied with the reporting requirement, the EPA used the information to support a showing of a
substantive violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
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ing a separate health or safety regulation.1 42 On the other hand, the
self-reporting scheme is not crucial to the statutory purpose of H.R.
7040. Although the government has an interest in protecting the public
against safety and health hazards, the likelihood that it would use the
information in a subsequent prosecution and the attendant risks of self-
incrimination outweigh the government's interest in obtaining the
disclosures.
Both the fifth amendment and the government's prosecutorial inter-
est under H.R. 7040 could be accommodated under Justice Harlan's
suggestion to consider use immunity. If the bill incorporated a use im-
munity provision, it could continue to require a manager to disclose his
discovery of a concealed serious danger. The manager could object to
the introduction of the information in a subsequent criminal proceed-
ing, however, should it be incriminating. The government would re-
main free to prove any violations by independent sources. Thus, both
interests would be accommodated: the government's regulatory inter-
est and the individual's interest against self-incrimination. 143
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
Drafting deficiencies' 44 and constitutional objections145 to H.R. 7040
suggest that it may be an inappropriate measure for deterring corporate
crime 146 and for shifting the burden of social responsibility for health
and safety to corporations. 147 Other proposals for achieving these same
142. For example, a Ford "manager's" disclosure of the defective Pinto fuel tank could be
used as evidence that Ford violated NHTSA safety standard 301, 49 C.F.R. § 571.301, S 5.5
(1979). A disclosure of the danger would necessarily involve detail concerning the scope of the
danger and its potential effect on human beings as within the definition of "serious concealed
danger." The government then would be relieved of its burden of showing that the defective fuel
tank did not meet the safety standards.
143. Several drafters believed a grant of immunity would be disadvantageous. "It could con-
ceivably be used by one who has in fact been involved in some kind of coverup of a prohibited
activity, and be a tool for one of a number of actors to disassociate himself with.. . a conspiracy
fraud." Hearings, supra note 7, at 608.
144. See notes 44-105 supra and accompanying text.
145. See notes 106-43 supra and accompanying text.
146. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
The proposed statute is objectionable on the further ground that it employs fines and imprison-
ment to effectuate its purpose. The sanctions are a partial response to criticism that corporate
criminal fines are but a cost of doing business. See Glenn, The Crime of'Tollution'" The Role of
Federal Water Pollution CriminalSanctions, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 835, 836 (1973); Levin, Crimes
.4gainst Employees: Substantive Criminal Sanctions Under the Occupational Safety andHealth Act,
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goals include federal corporate chartering1 48 and deconcentration and
divestiture. 49 These proposals, however, contain features making
them undesirable alternatives.150 An existing statute, the Racketeer In-
fluences and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),15" ' may be the most
feasible alternative to H.R. 7040.
RICO is the product of efforts to eradicate organized crime's infiltra-
tion of legitimate business organizations.1 52  RICO prohibits invest-
ment in,1 53  acquisition or maintenance of an interest in, ' 5 4  or
participation in the affairs of15 5 an enterprise s 6 engaged in interstate or
14 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 717, 736-37 (1977); Regulating Corporate Behavior, supra note 3, at 1336;
Comment, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crimes-A Problem in the Law of Sanc-
tions, 71 YALE LJ. 280, 293 (1961). The statute sets a fine of up to $250,000 for individuals and
$1,000,000 for corporations. H.R. 7040, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § l(a), reprinted in Hearings, supra
note 7, at 582, 582-83.
The proposed statute also allows imprisonment of individuals for up to five years. Id. Yet the
effectiveness of this criminal sanction as a deterrent to corporate crime is questionable. Despite
the statute's goal of deterrence, many judges refuse to sentence corporate executives to prison
terms, believing that the offender has been sufficiently punished through participation in the crim-
inal process. See Mann, Wheeler & Scott, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender, 17 Am. CRIM. L.
REv. 479,486 (1980). Furthermore, judges are reluctant to imprison corporate executives because
they want to avoid eliminating the positive contribution that corporate executives make to the
community. Id. at 488. See also Regulating Corporate Behavior, supra note 3, at 1367.
148. Federal corporate chartering would mean that the federal government, through articles of
registration, would incorporate business organizations. Federal rules would govern the activities
of corporations. State chartering is the method by which business entities presently are incorpo-
rated. Advocates of federal chartering criticize the present system as ineffective in the modern era
of the multinational corporation. States are limited in their resources to control illegal corporate
behavior. See generally R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORA-
TION (1976). See also M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRME 310-13 (1980).
Federal corporate chartering may make business conduct more difficult and might also lead
eventually to public ownership of corporations. Id. at 313.
149. Under a deconcentration and divestiture policy the federal government would require
large corporations to divest themselves of certain product lines and businesses. Though congres-
sional leaders have proposed several bills to effectuate this end, the legislation has failed to pass.
See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 148, at 315.
150. For other proposals, see id. at 299-325.
151. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
152. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL AcT
OF 1969, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
154. Id. § 1962(b).
155. Id. § 1962(c).
156. "Enterprise" is defined to include "any individual partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity." Id. § 1961(4). Courts have struggled with the precise meaning of the word despite the
statutory definition. Until United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981), the lower federal
courts were in conflict over the extension of "enterprise" to cover wholly illegitimate organiza-
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foreign commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity.' 57
Despite evidence that Congress intended RICO to address only the
infiltration of organized crime into legitimate businesses, 158 extremely
broad judicial constructions of the statute have transformed RICO into
a measure that can be used against a broad range of criminal activ-
ity.'59 As such, RICO can extend to corporate concealment of health
and safety dangers.
Liability under RICO is predicated upon proof of a pattern of racke-
teering activity.' 60  Racketeering activity includes eight state law of-
fenses and twenty-six federal law offenses.' 6' To find a pattern of
racketeering activity the court must determine that the defendant has
committed at least two of the predicate acts within ten years of each
tions. See, e.g.. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979) (enterprise liability not
limited to legitimate enterprise), vacated, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Diecidue,
603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979) (enterprise includes robbery, counterfeiting, murder, and illegal use
ot explosives), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir.
1976) (enterprise not limited to legitimate businesses). Contra, United States v. Moeller, 402 F.
Sapp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975) (enterprise limited to legitimate organizations), overruled, United States
v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976). For further discussion, see Bradley, Racketeers,
Congress and the Courts. An 4nalysis of RICO, 65 IowA L. REv. 837 (1980); Note, Organized
Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remediesfor "CriminalActivity'; 124 U.
PENN. L, REv. 192 (1975); Note, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations.- Distinguishing
the "Enterprise" Issues, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1343 (1981).
157. See notes 160-62 infra and accompanying text.
158. See note 152 supra.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1979) (Act not restricted to
members of organized crime), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Campanale, 518
F.2d 352, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1975) (RICO makes certain activities unlawful no matter who engages
m them), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1018-19
(D. Md. 1976) (although primary concern to curb organized crime, RICO not intended to apply
c clusively to organized crime). But see Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y.
!475) (RICO aimed at society of criminals operating outside control of American people).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
161. Id. § 1961(1). The eight state acts include murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, and dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs. The 26 federal acts cover a
broader range of activities and include bribery, sports bribery, counterfeiting, theft from interstate
shipment, embezzlement from pension and welfare funds, extortionate credit transactions, trans-
mission of gambling information, mail fraud, wire fraud, obstruction of justice, obstruction of a
.rininal investigation, obstruction of state and local law enforcement, interference with com-
merce, robbery, extortion, racketeering, interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, un-
lawful welfare fund payments, prohibition of illegal gambling businesses, interstate transportation
o stolen property, trafficking in contraband cigarettes, white slave traffic, restrictions on loans and
payments to labor organizations, embezzlement from union funds, bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the
sale of securities, and felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling
or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs.
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other. 1
62
Upon a finding of liability, a defendant is subject to the most striking
feature of RICO, its penalties provision.1 63 The criminal penalties in-
clude a maximum $25,000 fine and/or a maximum sentence of twenty
years imprisonment. Furthermore, the statute provides for criminal
forfeiture to the United States of any interest in a business acquired or
maintained in violation of the substantive provisions of the Act.164 It is
the criminal forfeiture provision that makes RICO a particularly viable
alternative to H.R. 7040.
The forfeiture provision is divided into two sections. First, a defend-
ant must forfeit any interest he acquired or maintained in violation of
the Act.165 Second, he must forfeit any interest or security in, claim
against, or property or contractual right in the enterprise.1 66 Few re-
ported cases have stated formally what kinds of interests are forfeitable
under these sections. 67  In United States v. Meyers,168 however, the
court interpreted "interest" to mean a continuing ownership interest
rather than the dividends or profits from that interest.1 69 The court in
United States v. MarubeniAmerica Corp. 170 defined more generally the
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976). The recurring issue under this definition is whether the predi-
cate acts must be related to each other. See e.g., United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (acts must be connected by a common scheme, plan, or motive), aJ'd, 578 F.2d
1371, cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (pattern requires more than accidental or unrelated instances of the proscribed
behavior), af'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v.
Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57-5 8 (D. Conn. 1975) (different criminal episodes, separate in time but
factually connected).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976).
164. Section 1963 provides that
Whoever violates any provision.. . shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he
has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security
of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influ-
ence over, any enterprise he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or partici-
pated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
Id. § 1963(a)(1).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 1963(a)(2).
167. The statute does not define the term "interest." Those cases that do discuss the forfeiture
clause usually discuss only its constitutionality. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp.
134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
168. 432 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
169. Id. at 461. See also United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 n.6 (3d Cir. 1981); United
States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 811-12 (5th c.r. 1980).
170. 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980). Defendants were charged with violating RICO by con-
ducting a bribery scheme.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/12
CORPORATE NONDISCLOSURE LIABILITY
interests under the forfeiture section. The first section requires forfei-
ture of illegally acquired interests. 1 ' The second section reaches inter-
ests even when the enterprise was legally acquired and maintained. 172
RICO provides a feasible alternative to H.R. 7040. Although the
type of corporate activity the drafters of H.R. 7040 cited as the impetus
for the proposed statute1 73 would not constitute a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity in every situation,174 some theories of liability might be via-
ble. If mail, wire, or other kinds of interstate fraudulent activity were
shown, a corporate manager might be liable under RICO.175 A viola-
tion would trigger RICO's forfeiture provision. The second section of
that provision could require an individual to forfeit his interest or se-
curity in, claim against, or property or contractual right in the enter-
prise.7 6 Thus, for example, the Act could require a coirporate
executive, liable for concealing defects or dangers through a pattern of
racketeering activity, to forfeit any stock he holds in the corporation
together with any claim or contractual rights giving him influence over
the entity.
Application of RICO would facilitate the deterrence function the
drafters of H.R. 7040 desired. A corporate executive might hesitate
before concealing dangers or defects if he thought that such conduct
would lead to the loss of his interests and rights in the enterprise. By
acting as a deterrent, the forfeiture provision of RICO would shift the
burden of responsibility for health and safety dangers to the corporate
sector. A corporate officer might take extra precautions in manufactur-
ing rather than risk the forfeiture penalties.
171. Id. at 769. The court interpreted "interest" in § 1963(a)(1) not to include income received
through a pattern of racketeering activity. It reasoned that the one percent investment exception
in § 1962(a), which limits the government's ability to seize income received through a pattern of
racketeering activity, sanctioned forfeiture of income under § 1963(a)(1) only after that income
was invested in an enterprise. Id. at 766-67.
172. Id. at 769. See also United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 143 (N.D. Ga. 1979), in
which the court stated that interests subject to forfeiture under § 1963(a)(2) include not only prop-
erty that the enterprise is capable of owning but also property that a person may hold in his
individual capacity and has put under the control of an entity that cannot legally hold the
property.
173. See notes 11-31 supra and accompanying text.
174. See note 161 supra.
175. RICO was suggested as an alternative to H.R. 7040 at the legislative hearings. See Hear-
ings, supra note 37, at 592 (statement of Mr. Leonard).
176. See note 164 supra.
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V. CONCLUSION
Corporations have a favorable impact on public activity in a variety
of ways. They also create unwarranted health and safety dangers.
H.R. 7040 is an attempt to accommodate these competing considera-
tions. The drafters acknowledged that corporations create benefits by
limiting the statute's scope to activities whose effects are detrimental to
the public.'77 They also attempted to decrease the number of health
and safety dangers corporations create by requiring disclosure of dis-
covered dangers.'78 Deficiencies in the statutory language179 and con-
stitutional limitations' 80 demonstrate, however, that the proposed
statute does not fully accommodate these considerations. The goals of
deterrence and corporate acceptance of the responsibility for ensuring
health and safety can better be achieved through existing statutes. 8 '
Thus, additional legislation is unnecessary. Legislative goals can be ac-
complished through more artful interpretations of existing criminal
measures.
Tracy J. Van Steenburgh
177. See notes 32-37 supra and accompanying text.
178. See id.
179. See notes 44-105 supra and accompanying text.
180. See notes 106-43 supra and accompanying text.
181. See notes 144-78 supra and accompanying text.
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